Gregory Redmond v. William Manfredi by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-9-2011 
Gregory Redmond v. William Manfredi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Gregory Redmond v. William Manfredi" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1685. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1685 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
HLD-042 (November  2010)                NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3464 
 ___________ 
 
 GREGORY T. REDMOND, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
WILLIAM J. MANFREDI 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
 (E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:10-cv-03543) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Norma L. Shapiro 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 30, 2010 
 Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: March 9, 2011)  
_________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
  In July 2010, Gregory Redmond filed a pro se civil rights action in the 
District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Honorable William J. Manfredi of 
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.  Redmond claimed that in a civil suit he had 
brought in the Court of Common Pleas, Judge Manfredi denied Redmond’s motion to 
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proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) based on the “merits of [his] case,” as opposed to an 
assessment to Redmond’s “income status.”  Redmond argued that this was a violation of 
his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.  The 
District Court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  
Redmond timely appealed the ruling to this Court.   
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions.  See Mitchell v. 
Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003).  Because we have granted Redmond IFP status 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we review this appeal for possible dismissal in accordance 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  We will dismiss an appeal under § 1915(e) if it lacks an 
arguable basis in fact or law.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
  The District Court properly dismissed Redmond’s claim pursuant to § 
1915(e)(2), as his claim lacked an arguable basis in fact or law.  It is a well-established 
principle that judges are absolutely immune from suits for damages under § 1983 when 
they act in a judicial capacity.  See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) 
(citation omitted) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took 
was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be 
subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’”).  As 
the District Court correctly observed, nothing in the record indicates that the act 
Redmond complains of — denying his motion to proceed IFP — was performed by Judge 
Manfredi outside the scope of his judicial duties.  Accordingly, Judge Manfredi is entitled 
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to judicial immunity.  See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768-69 (3d Cir. 
2000).   
  In documents filed in support of his appeal, Redmond argues that Judge 
Manfredi violated his First Amendment right to free speech, and also asserts that the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) somehow precludes Judge Manfredi from immunity.  
Redmond’s First Amendment argument simply asserts another underlying basis for his § 
1983 claim, which as discussed above is barred by judicial immunity.  Redmond does not 
explain how the FTCA could affect a judge’s immunity when acting in his judicial 
capacity, and we are not aware of any statutory or case law that would support such an 
argument.  As a result, Redmond’s arguments in support of his appeal do not change the 
conclusion that Judge Manfredi is entitled to immunity.  If Redmond had wished to 
directly challenge the denial of his IFP motion, he should have appealed within the 
Pennsylvania state courts. 
 Having found no merit to Redmond’s appeal, we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
 
